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	Some twenty-five years ago, Stanley Benn suggested that the term ‘wickedness’ had fallen undeservedly on hard times.​[1]​ Part of the problem is that ‘wickedness’ and its cognates are ambiguous and admit of both positive and negative connotations: a harsh winter might be described as a “wicked season”; a talented musician might perform a “wicked solo” or be described as being “wicked awesome!” and so forth.  Further, ‘wicked’ is typically thought to be synonymous with terms like ‘ungodly’ and ‘blasphemous’ and ‘impious’ that arguably belongs to an outdated moral vernacular.  Still, some of our best moral philosophers—no less than Benn, Joel Feinberg and Ronald Milo—have found wickedness important enough to discuss it at some length.​[2]​  One reason to reconsider the concept of wickedness is because they have.
	Another reason to reconsider the concept of wickedness is because further consideration might reveal something about the concept of evil.​[3]​  One standard primary definition equates wickedness with being “evil or morally wrong.”​[4]​ Admittedly, like ‘wicked,’ the term ‘evil’ is ambiguous; we speak of necessary evils, of the lesser (and presumably greater) of two evils, the logical and evidential problem of evil, the “Evil Empire” and the “Axis of Evil”; Feinberg even speaks of evil smells.​[5]​ However else the term is understood, I am interested in what I take to be the sense of ‘evil’ used precisely—that is, as “the worst possible term of opprobrium imaginable.”​[6]​ 
Indeed, if ‘evil’ is the worst possible term of opprobrium imaginable, then perhaps the worst of us are evil.​[7]​  Feinberg suggests a relationship between the morally worst sort of people and evil people in the following:
Suppose that we rank character traits, including those that are virtuous and those that are vicious, on a progressive scale.  As persons line up to be assigned their places in the rankings, they are judged steadily worse as they are linked to steadily more blameworthy traits… As a person descends the scale to each ranking position, he gets worse and worse, that is, he qualifies as more and more blameworthy until he reaches some maximum point at which he is as evil as he can be…​[8]​
Roughly, evil people just are those who reside at the far vicious end of Feinberg’s continuum while everyone else is not evil, whatever else is wrong with them. This is not a material claim but a modal claim ranging over possible worlds: roughly, the evil person just is the morally worst sort of person.  There is something plausible about this way of understanding evil people. Describing someone as evil “has the quality of ne plus ultra: Where do you go from there?”​[9]​ This way of thinking about evil people suggests a heuristic for determining who is evil and who is not: the more that we are more prone to suppose that many other people are morally worse than some token individual, the less likely it is that the token individual is evil, and the less that we are prone to suppose that many other people are morally worse, the more likely that token individual is evil.  Undoubtedly, as with most predicates, there will be some vagueness with respect to who counts as evil and who does not.  The real problem is that it lacks any real content: without knowing more about who counts as the morally worst sort of person, we will have not come very far in understanding what evil people are like. The challenge is to articulate just what it is to be the morally worst sort of person as opposed to being merely a morally bad or flawed person.
	I shall argue that reflection on the concept of wickedness reveals an adequate account of evil personhood.  Some philosophers deny that there is any substantive connection between evil personhood and wickedness, noting the apparent oddity of claiming (merely) that Hitler was wicked.​[10]​ As I have conceded, however, the term ‘wicked’ and its cognates are ambiguous such that our pre-theoretic intuitions involving Hitler’s alleged wickedness are not all clearly tracking the same concept.  My claim is that reflection on what philosophers like Milo and Feinberg and especially Benn have to say about wickedness reveals a perfectly adequate analysis of evil personhood.

Typologies of Wickedness
Generally, Benn claims that wickedness is “whatever it is about someone that warrants our calling him a wicked person.”​[11]​ Of course, this reveals no more about wickedness than the thesis that generosity is “whatever it is about someone that warrants our calling him a generous person” reveals about generosity.  Both Milo and Benn offer typologies of wickedness, distinguishing various varieties of moral depravity and immorality might fall into the extension of ‘wickedness’ generally.  Fairly clearly, some of the varieties of wickedness that Benn and Milo consider are worse than others, and that seems relevant to determining what the morally worst sort of people—that is, evil person—are like.
Milo’s typology is organized around a fairly clear conceptual distinction: some morally flawed persons tend to recognize and believe that their morally wrong actions are, in fact, wrong.  Those persons are guilty of “conscious wrongdoing” while other wrongdoers are guilty of “unconscious wrongdoing.”​[12]​ Milo goes on to distinguish at least three different varieties of wickedness related to unconscious wrongdoing: perverse wickedness, moral negligence, and amorality.  In cases of perverse wickedness, an agent is guilty of unconscious wrongdoing and wrongly believes that her wrongdoing is right.​[13]​ In cases of moral negligence, an agent is guilty of unconscious wrongdoing and recognizes that certain act-types are wrong but fails to recognize that her action is of that type and thus fails to believe that she acts wrongly.​[14]​ Finally, an agent who suffers from amorality is guilty of unconscious wrongdoing but believes neither that what she does is wrong nor right insofar as she lacks moral principles that pertain to acts of that type.​[15]​  Since all of these varieties of wickedness are defined in terms of an agent’s tendency to engage in unconscious wrongdoing, they could be grouped under the more general heading of unconscious wickedness as opposed to conscious wickedness which does involve a tendency to engage in conscious wrongdoing.
All three varieties of unconscious wickedness have at least one further thing in common: they all fail to characterize evil people.  For example, Milo supposes that someone who wrongly believes that she acts rightly exhibits the “saving grace of conscientiousness”—a morally redeeming property that evil people presumably lack, such that while persons suffering from perverse wickedness may be vicious and morally flawed, they are not the morally worst sort of person.​[16]​ Similarly, Benn identifies conscientious wickedness as yet another variety of wickedness, a sort of ruthlessness in pursuit of something regarded as morally good.​[17]​ But parity of reasoning suggests that the conscientiously wicked person is also not evil because she too is morally redeemable in a way that evil people are not.
Milo’s morally negligent person is oddly named.  In legalese, a negligent person fails to take a standard of care that a reasonable person would take and is culpable for that failure.  But Milo’s morally “negligent” person need not be culpable; for all Milo says, the failure to realize that one’s act is perfectly innocent or understandable and not at all a culpable mistake.  Similarly, Milo’s amoralist is also not clearly culpable for the fact that she fails to recognize that her action is wrong.  Some amoralists lack moral concepts altogether—just as animals and young children probably do—and thus are oddly regarded as evil, as Rousseau suggested some time ago.​[18]​
Benn too distinguishes various varieties of wickedness that fall short of evil.  For example, Benn considers self-centered forms of wickedness, a kind of moral narcissism where consideration of what is good is “defined by reference to the agent himself.”​[19]​ Especially selfish people suffer from self-centered wickedness but so do patriots who only pursue what is good for their country (because it is their country), nepotists who only favor members of their family (because they are members of their family), and so forth.  Such people might be morally flawed, but it would be odd to suppose that they are evil; they too might believe that their wrong actions are right.  Thus, Benn concludes that this is “the least problematic kind” of wickedness.​[20]​ Similarly, Benn identifies psychopathy as a variety of wickedness that involves the inability to “decenter”—to see, for example, how the well-being of others could be a reason to act at all.​[21]​ Benn’s psychopath seems to suffer from amorality; decentered moral distinctions are “simply unintelligible to him.”​[22]​ So, since we have reason to doubt that an amoralist is evil, we have reason to doubt that Benn’s psychopath is evil; at least, if Benn’s psychopath is evil, it is not in virtue of his “psychopathy” or amorality.
Turn, then, to varieties of conscious wickedness—varieties of morally depraved personhood that do involve a tendency to recognize and believe that one’s morally wrong actions are, in fact, morally wrong. Milo distinguishes three different varieties of conscious wrongdoing: moral indifference, preferential wickedness, and a Christian conception of wickedness.  Agents suffering from preferential wickedness recognize their wrongdoing but act wrongly because of a stronger desire to perform that wrong action that trumps a comparatively weaker desire to do something else.​[23]​ Since preferentially wicked people have at least some non-trivial desire to act rightly, they are better sorts of people than those who have no desire to act rightly at all and are, therefore, not evil. Moral indifference and the Christian conception of wickedness involve conscious wrongdoing plus the absence of morally redeeming emotions like remorse or shame.  As will become clear below, I take this moral indifference to be especially crucial to evil personhood.  However, Milo does not identify moral indifference or Christian wickedness per se as the worst variety of wickedness; neither does Benn.  Rather, both suppose that the very worst sort of wickedness that marks evil people involves something more sinister.  I consider this especially sinister variety of wickedness in the following section, if only to dismiss it as an account of evil personhood.

Satanic Wickedness
	Famously, Kant denies that human beings could be “devilish”—beings “whose reason was entirely exempt from the moral law.”​[24]​  Thus, Kant denies the possibility of knowingly doing evil for its own sake,​[25]​ a move that some philosophers find implausible:
Kant’s ethics is inadequate to the understanding of Auschwitz because Kant denies the possibility of the deliberate rejection of the moral law.  Not even a wicked man, Kant holds, can will evil for the sake of evil. [Since Kant denies] the possibility of a person knowingly doing evil for its own sake… Kant proposed a theory that rules out the contravening evidence of human experience.​[26]​
Apparently, human experience indicates, pace Kant, that knowingly doing evil for its own sake is possible.  A tendency to knowingly do evil for its own sake might well be dubbed satanic wickedness, recalling Satan’s infamous imperative from Paradise Lost: “Evil. be thou my good.”​[27]​ A number of philosophers agree with Silber against Kant that satanic wickedness is possible, but also assert that it is wickedness of the very worst sort—the sort of wickedness that marks evil persons.​[28]​ Milo suggests that “true wickedness”—as distinct from more tepid varieties—consists in “deliberately and knowingly doing what is morally wrong,”​[29]​ wickedness in its “worst form.”​[30]​  Benn makes the weaker claim that satanic wickedness should be “totally abhorred,” but this is a claim he makes about no other variety of wickedness in his typology.​[31]​ Singer supposes that satanic wickedness is “evil, in its most extreme or malignant form.”​[32]​ All three, then, appear to accept the following:
(SW): evil personhood consists in satanic wickedness—a person, p, is evil just in case p knowingly does evil for the sake of evil.
So understood, the difference between merely bad and evil persons is that while merely bad persons act wrongly, evil persons knowingly do evil for evil’s sake.
	It would be a mistake to suppose that (SW) is impossible because evil people cannot recognize that they are guilty of evil actions.​[33]​ Otherwise, knowingly and deliberately engaging in evildoing would actually exonerate one from the charge of being evil, an implausible result. Worse, plausible examples of real-life evil persons seem to know full well that they are guilty of evil action.​[34]​ So knowingly doing evil for its own sake is not inconsistent with being evil.  But is it necessary?  Part of the problem is that it is not entirely clear what knowingly doing evil for its own sake amounts to.  Several points should be made.
First, it is not altogether clear why evil requires knowingly doing evil for its own sake, and not merely as opposed to knowingly acting wrongly, for example.  Perhaps the thought is that if evil personhood only required knowingly acting wrongly for its own sake, then a lifetime of mischief would suffice for being evil and that might seem wrong. But then proponents of (SW) are taking some unarticulated account of evil action for granted, thus giving conceptual priority to evil actions.  Giving evil action conceptual priority to evil personhood is not obviously objectionable, but it does conflict with the stated goals of at least some proponents of (SW).​[35]​ Absent an account of evil action, it is difficult to assess the merits of (SW).
	Second, insofar as it demands that evil people knowingly do evil for its own sake, (SW) implies agents who falsely believe that they are guilty of evildoing are not evil, no matter how much they identify with their believed wrongdoing.  If Satan believes that he is pelting the Yucatan peninsula with hurricanes and that doing so is an evil action, but in reality he is only causing gentle rain to fall on arid fields, he would not knowingly be doing evil for its own sake; he is not clearly doing evil at all.  But that means that Satan is not evil in spite of the fact that he thinks he is causing grave suffering absent any compunction, even relishing in the horrors of his imagined disaster.  
Third, it remains unclear what knowingly doing evil for its own sake amounts to.  Knowingly doing evil “for its own sake” might mean that an evil person desires intrinsically that she should do evil.  Perhaps the “most evil desire of all” is a desire to do what is morally wrong “as an end in itself.”​[36]​  Alternatively, knowingly doing evil “for its own sake” might mean that an evil person directly intends to do evil.  An agent who directly intends to do evil does not merely intend to act wrongly as a means to realize something else, nor does she merely foresee that she will act wrongly.​[37]​ Benn, for example, suggests that evil persons do not merely “do evil” but do it “with evil intent”​[38]​ and act “under the aspect of evil.”​[39]​  It is commonly supposed that A can  intentionally only if she intends to  “under some description,” one that reveals what A found desirable about her -ing.​[40]​  Perhaps the idea is the very evilness of evil action that is desirable to evil persons, such that evil persons intend to act wrongly under the description of an action. Finally, knowingly doing evil “for its own sake might mean that the evilness of an evil person’s action is her reason for acting.​[41]​ Feinberg’s “purely evil” person, for example, “decides to do an act which he believes wrong in itself” and “will do it precisely because of its wrongness.”​[42]​ 
It is unnecessary to sort out these various ways of understanding what knowingly doing evil for its own sake amounts to, for any expanded version of (SW) is bound to encounter fatal difficulties.  Interestingly, (SW) poorly handles the paradigmatic example of a satanically wicked person—Satan himself—an odd result if Satan is supposed to epitomize satanic wickedness.​[43]​ Admittedly, Satan is a difficult character to understand.​[44]​  This is partly because he is self-deceived if not an outright liar.​[45]​  Still, (SW) is far too crude to illuminate Satan’s evil character, partly because it is fails to make room for the role of Satan’s emotion.  Satan vacillates between remorseful contemplation of his misdeeds and indignation, between sentimentality and rancor; only thirty-five lines into Paradise Lost, Milton refers to Satan’s “guile stirred up with envy.”​[46]​ Satan “in sighs began” the soliloquy containing his infamous imperative and with “grieved look he fixes sad” as he delivers it.​[47]​ He also laments that it was “pride and worse ambition [that] threw me down.”​[48]​ While delivering his soliloquy, Satan’s face “Thrice changed with pale, ire, envy and despair.”​[49]​ 
Focusing on Satan’s emotional economy casts doubt on the claim that he is satanically wicked.  Satan envy suggests that he covets what God has, not that he intrinsically desires to act wrongly.  Ambition calls for, arguably, intending to succeed; it would be odd to claim of someone both that she is ambitious but does not intend to succeed.  Since Satan probably knows that his efforts to defeat God will fail and since, arguably, one cannot intend to do what one believes to be impossible, it is not likely that Satan directly intends to overthrow God.  Given his ire and wounded pride, Satan may find his act desirable under the description of a rebellious action, but not as a morally wrong one.  Indeed, given Satan’s deep despair, it is unlikely that he would be motivated to perform actions that he finds worthwhile and might instead take the futility of some action—warring with God springs to mind—that is futile by his own lights.​[50]​  But then Satan’s reason for acting is tied up with his despair, not the wrongness of his action.  But then no way of understanding what it is to knowingly doing evil for its own sake adequately characterizes Satan.  
	(SW) poorly handles Satan for another reason.  Recall that Satan bids farewell to remorse prior to uttering the infamous imperative. Suppose Satan becomes satanically wicked as a result of uttering his infamous imperative but that the transformation takes an instant to work: at t1, Satan is willing to transform himself absent any compunction; at t2, he actually utters “Evil, be thou my good”; at t3, he becomes satanically wicked.  Arguably, Satan is as bad at t1 as he is at t3 just because he is willing to become satanically wicked absent compunction.​[51]​   But that suggests that Satan was evil prior to becoming satanically wicked such that (SW) is simply false.  Arguably, “Evil, be thou my good” is not the cause of Satan’s evil character, but an expression of one.
Most importantly, (SW) badly characterizes putative examples of evil people. We oddly and implausibly aggrandize the Nazi’s motivations by saying they did “evil for its own sake.”​[52]​ By his own account, Stangl acted “out of survival” and he lacked anything like malicious intent.​[53]​ According to Arendt, aside from “an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his own personal advancement, [Eichmann] had no motives at all.”​[54]​ Generally, it is far from clear that any putative evil people are evil if (SW) is correct.  Singer is quite willing to describe a motley crew of rapists and murderers, lynching racists, homophobic killers, and sadists as evil people and indeed, many are as plausible examples of evil people as are likely to be found.​[55]​  Yet I can see no reason to suppose that all of them knowingly did evil for its own sake and Singer provides none.  So with Hitler, Robert Alton Harris, Stalin, Pol Pot, or any other member of the rogues gallery of putative evil persons: whatever else is wrong with them, and of course there is plenty wrong with them, they just are not well characterized by (SW). Philosophical consideration of evil personhood will surely proceed via the method of reflective equilibrium, and that will require finding coherence between general principles relevant to understanding evil people and particular judgments about evil persons.  Insofar as (SW) simply does not cohere with particular judgments about evil persons, it is difficult to see why (SW) should survive reflective equilibrium.
Of course, Satan is evil if anyone is but if a satanic Satan is evil, it is not because he is satanically wicked.  If satanic wickedness is not essential to being evil, what is?  Deliberately or not, Benn implicitly provides an answer.

Wickedness Tout Court
Again, Benn distinguishes a number of different varieties of wickedness in his typology, but he also occasionally considers wickedness without qualification—that is, wickedness tout court.  Aside from the modest suggestion, noted above, that wickedness is what warrants calling someone ‘evil,’ Benn makes some comparatively substantive claims about wickedness tout court: first, a wicked person “must have within their repertoire some humane principles”​[56]​; second, a wicked person “must be disposed to act, or respond, in accordance with evil maxims”​[57]​; finally, when faced with difficult and painful choices, a wicked person finds them “neither difficult nor painful since the considerations that would make them so are systematically neutralized.”​[58]​ All three of these claims require significant elaboration but they jointly constitute an adequate analysis of evil personhood.  To be clear, I submit that, whatever his seeming loyalties to (SW), Benn actually suggests an account of wickedness tout court and, ipso facto, an account of evil personhood.

Humane Principles
Again, Benn claims that wickedness that a wicked person “must have within their repertoire some humane principles.”  To illustrate, he considers perversely wicked fictional Aztec priests who wrongly believe that they act rightly by sacrificing innocents to their gods.  Benn’s Aztecs are crucially different from, say, Hitler who “had access to humane principles implicit in the European moral tradition” that afforded him ample reason to treat the suffering of Jews “as of some account.”​[59]​  Benn’s Aztecs, apparently, lacked access to any such principles.  Benn concludes that while his Aztecs can be exonerated from the charge of wickedness, Hitler cannot and that, quite generally, wickedness requires access to humane principles. One might have thought that having access to humane principles would make someone a better sort of person, not evil. There is, admittedly, something of a paradox here; if wickedness is supposed to be sufficient for being evil, why think that wickedness requires access to humane principles?  Why suppose that the worst of us do has, rather than lacks, access to humane principles within their moral repertoire? 
It is tempting to understand Benn as claiming that Hitler is worse than his Aztecs because Hitler “should have known better” precisely because Hitler had access to humane principles.  But to be clear, Benn is not merely making an epistemic claim here; Hitler would hardly treat the suffering of Jews as of some account if he made a mental note of their suffering and gone on as before without hesitation.  Surely genuinely treating someone’s suffering as of some account requires not simply believing that there are moral reasons to act differently, but translating those moral beliefs into action.  So while having access to humane principles seemingly involves “knowing better”—that is, some epistemic capacity for tracking moral reasons for acting—it presumably also involves a motivational capacity to act for moral reasons.
So, supposing that “access to humane principles” is necessary for wickedness, wickedness requires at least two things: a capacity to be receptive to moral reasons for action and a capacity to be reactive to moral reasons.  The former capacity involves the ability to recognize the existence of moral reasons while the latter involves the ability to translate them appropriately into action.  Let M stand for whatever mechanism issues in deliberation and action.  An agent is weakly receptive to moral reasons only if, holding M fixed across possible worlds, there is some nearby possible world in which there is a moral reason, R, to perform (or refrain from performing) some action, A, and M tracks R such that the agent believes that she should (not) A.  Similarly, an agent is weakly reactive to moral reasons only if, holding M fixed across possible worlds, there is some nearby possible world in which there is a reason, R, to perform (or refrain from performing) some action, A, and M issues in (or prevents) A because of R.​[60]​ By contrast, an agent is strongly receptive and reactive just in case M tracks R in every possible world in which there is a moral reason for her to A, such that she always believes that she should (not) A and M issues in (or prevents) A because of R in every nearby possible world when there are moral reasons for her to act accordingly.
Return, then, to Hitler and Benn’s Aztecs.  Presumably, if Hitler “should have known better” such that he should have recognized the existence of moral reasons to act differently and altered his behavior accordingly, then he is at least weakly receptive and reactive to moral reasons for action.  By contrast, given that Benn’s Aztecs lacked access to those humane principles, they are not even weakly receptive and reactive to moral reasons for action.  So, if Hitler, but not Benn’s Aztecs are plausibly regarded as evil, then the following is plausible:
(W1): a person, p, is evil only if p’s action-issuing mechanism, M, is both weakly receptive and weakly reactive to moral reasons for action
Generally, the ability to access humane principles and to treat the suffering of others as of some account should be understood in terms of receptivity and reactivity to moral reasons, such that no one who is not at least weakly receptive and reactive to moral reasons is evil.  
	But why suppose that (W1) is correct?  Why suppose that evil people have, rather than lack, access to humane principles?  Consider what someone entirely unreceptive and unreactive to moral reasons is like: they would be entirely deaf to moral discourse, never believing that there are moral reasons to act differently; they would not be moved appropriately by cries for help or screams of pain, being entirely indifferent to such things; they would never perform a single morally worthy action in all their days and would, indeed, be incapable of acting as such; they would be more akin to monsters from the Buffy the Vampire Slayer universe than to other human beings; they would be bestial, not vicious.​[61]​ Perhaps there is some utility in understanding evil people this way, but it more resembles demonizing than moralizing.
	The point can be made in another way.  Again, the term ‘evil’ is the strongest term of moral disapprobation in our vocabulary.  As such, describing someone as ‘evil’ amounts to exercising negative reactive attitudes, something that makes sense only if the object of those attitudes is an apt candidate for them in the first place.  But an agent who is not even weakly receptive and reactive to moral reasons is simply not an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes insofar as they are entirely unresponsive to moral address and discourse.​[62]​ Thus, supposing that evil people are not even weakly receptive and reactive to moral reasons amounts to supposing that it is inappropriate to describe them as evil, a seemingly incoherent result. So, if we are to retain the thought that evil people are morally responsible human beings and not inhuman monsters beyond the pale of moral responsibility, we had better endorse (W1) with Benn.

Evil Maxims
Again, Benn claims that a wicked person “must be disposed to act, or respond, in accordance with evil maxims.”  Talk of “evil maxims” has a Kantian flavor, but Kant spoke of evil human beings, not evil maxims.  Just what is it for a maxim to be evil?  Benn has two proposals.  First, a maxim can be evil in virtue of its content if it is a maxim “that no one ought to act on at all.”​[63]​  Unfortunately, Benn says little about which maxims are those that no one ought to act on at all; intuitively, maxims calling for wanton murder or torturing kittens for fun make the cut.  Second, a maxim is evil if it “systematically excludes consideration of any good”​[64]​ or “rules that all considerations not directly validated by his primary ideal goal or principle are necessary subordinate.”​[65]​  So understood, a single-minded Nazi hell-bent on executing innocent Jews acts on an evil maxim since he systematically excludes consideration of any other good, but so does a single-minded author so bent on finishing his novel that he disregards his family.
	  Both components of this disjunctive account of evil maxims are problematic.  On the one hand, evil persons need not be disposed to act in accord with maxims that no one ought to act on at all: an evil person might act on maxims that call for giving backrubs if he falsely believes that doing so would cause malicious harm.  Similarly, some genuinely decent people might be disposed to act in accord with maxims that no one act to act on at all; if purchasing fair trade coffee somehow increases the suffering of children in developing nations then no one ought to act on maxims that call for purchasing fair trade coffee.  Connoisseurs of fair trade coffee might be preferentially wicked, but again, preferential wickedness is not sufficient for being evil. On the other hand, it is far from clear that a maxim that excludes or rules out all other considerations is an evil maxim.  On one influential account of sainthood, a moral saint’s life is dominated by a concern for others, even at the expense of other moral considerations such as her own happiness.​[66]​  But it is a stretch to insist that moral saints are either evil or disposed to act on evil maxims.
	Still, there are at least two reasons to suppose that Benn is right in thinking that evil maxims have something to do with wickedness and evil personhood.  First, it is terribly plausible that evil persons are disposed to engage in evildoing.​[67]​ The most plausible examples of evil persons are not passive voyeurs relishing but active agents responsible for all varieties of suffering and misery.  Any account of evil personhood that fails to capture the truism that evil people are disposed to do evil is implausible on its face.​[68]​ Second, it is plausible to suppose that evil people are willing to do some things that even other vicious (but not quite evil) people are not willing to do.  I expand on both of these claims below.
	If evil persons are disposed to engage in evildoing, how should evil action be understood?  It is common to suppose that atrocities—including acts of torture, genocide, rape, slavery, infanticide, and so forth—are clear examples of evildoing.​[69]​ One strategy for providing an account of evildoing is to focus on how morally decent people consider such atrocities and demarcate their reactions from those of putatively evil people.  Perhaps an action is evil if no ordinary reasonable decent human being could conceive of herself performing it.​[70]​ A certain amount of care is needed here; after all, a disturbing number of perpetrators of genocide—say, Rwandan Hutus who slaughtered their Tutsi countrymen—were, in other respects, morally decent people who probably would have denied that they could conceive of participating in genocide prior to actually doing so.  Further, an otherwise morally decent person could, if only in a moment of weakness, imagine engaging in some sort of atrocity.  Worse, even morally decent people can be tempted to do the unthinkable as suggested in the following anonymous philosopher’s disturbing anecdote about an incident involving “Luisa Pan Dulce,” the three-year old daughter of the family with whom he stayed while studying in Mexico City:
Lucia Pan Dulce and I were on a kind of mezzanine balcony that extended out over a tiled entrance parlor.  I threw her up a few times as usual and then I “found myself”(it seemed as passive as that) holding her firmly by her wrists as she dangled over the tiled parlor one floor below.  If I had dropped her, obviously she might have been seriously injured.  She seemed to have perfect trust in me at first, but then I felt her body become tense.  She returned to silence from her squealing and giggling, and an unaccustomed look of alarm was on her face.  Then it happened.  My arms went weak and felt like jelly.  My fingers were cold and sweaty.  I began to tremble uncontrollably.  I wondered if I was going to open up my hands and let her drop.  I felt my fingers twitch.  My arms felt weak and shaky from the wrists to the shoulders, and I was terrified.  Then I pulled her up and gently set her down.  I was so weary in the aftermath of an adrenaline surge that I lay on the floor for ten minutes.​[71]​
Not surprisingly, the anonymous philosopher is confused and more than a little frightened about what almost happened—about what he almost did.  But dropping her would not be evil on this account precisely because a morally decent person could conceive of himself committing said crime.
	Still, this account of evil action, while flawed, captures something relevant for an account of evil personhood. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘evil’ has its origins in Teutonic words meaning “exceeding due measure” or “overstepping proper limits.” Perhaps evil people are willing to overstep limits that constrain even morally bad persons.  In this vein, Adam Morton advocates a theory of evil action—a “barrier theory of evil”—according to which an act is evil when the deliberations of its agent bypass psychological barriers against even considering harming or humiliating others, considerations that ought to have been in place and in force.​[72]​ While Morton offers an account of evil action, not an account of evil personhood, his account nonetheless suggests the following: 
(W2): a person, p, is evil only if p is disposed to act wrongly and to knowingly transgress what morally decent people suppose are prohibitions against such actions in those circumstances
(W2) implies that evil people are not just disposed to act wrongly but that they are willing to transgress moral barriers—barriers that perhaps even morally bad people are not willing to transgress—just as Benn suggests.
	While both (W1) and (W2) are plausible, they do not jointly suffice as an account of evil personhood.  Many of us morally decent folk are sufficiently receptive and reactive to moral reasons as demanded by (W1) but also disposed to act wrongly and to knowingly transgress what are commonly regarded as moral prohibitions as demanded by (W2).  Recall that in the infamous Milgram experiments, sixty-five percent of subjects were willing to administer a maximum—and potentially lift-threatening—450 volts of electricity to an unseen (and unharmed) associate of the experimenter despite his screaming and protest and after he lapsed into silence that suggested unconsciousness or words.  Milgram’s results have been replicated over and over again, suggesting that at least very many of us morally decent people—people who are at least weakly receptive and reactive to moral reasons—are disposed to knowingly transgress common moral prohibitions.  But then, if (W1) and (W2) sufficed as an analysis of evil personhood, very many of us would be evil, an implausible result. 
Tinkering with (W2) is not likely to help.  Arguably, the willingness of Milgram subjects to harm seemingly innocent victims does not suffice to show that they are evil because those subjects found themselves in anomalous situations.  The real question is what they would do if they were in conditions that favored their autonomy—that is, when they were not compelled by circumstance to act in some particular way.​[73]​  So perhaps, a person is evil just in case she is disposed to violate moral transgressions when in autonomy-favoring conditions.​[74]​ But this is still not enough for evil personhood.  For even persons strongly disposed to violate moral transgressions absent situationalist influences might genuinely feel regret or shame or remorse for what they do.   Even autonomous agents might act wrongly and do so by their own lights and thus feel compunction for their own perceived moral wrongdoing.  But someone who feels compunction for their perceived wrongdoing is a better sort of person than someone who does not and is therefore not evil.  
To be clear, I do not suggest that either (W1) or (W2) are false; so long as we suppose that evil people are blameworthy and that they are willing to engage in grave moral wrongdoing, they are bound to be plausible.  Rather, the problem is that (W1) and (W2) are incomplete—that is, something is still missing from an adequate account of evil personhood.  Fortunately, Benn has already suggested how the analysis should be completed.

Painful Choices
Arguably, a lack of moral concern is the most promising candidate for a single, ultimate cause of immoral behavior.​[75]​  But lacking morally appropriate concern for one’s wrongdoing is not sufficient for being evil.  In Camus’ The Stranger, the prosecutor insists that Meursault is evil precisely because he expresses no remorse—indeed no emotion at all—throughout the trial after his beloved mother’s death.  However, if Meursault lacks remorse for causing the death of the Arab on the beach, he also lacks the animus typically expected of evil people and is, in any event, not a plausible example of an evil person.
Still, if genuinely contrite agents are better sorts of people than their counterparts who lack contrition, then lacking guilt and regret and shame and remorse for one’s wrongdoing does seem crucial to understanding evil personhood.  Benn’s suggestion that wicked people find difficult and painful choices “neither difficult nor painful” is illuminating here.   To be sure, evil people might well find some choices to be difficult and painful: choosing a cell-phone plan might be complicated and give rise to a headache, and evil people can agree.  More plausibly, evil persons fail to find a limited but morally significant range of choices to be difficult and painful—that is, the sort of choices that a morally decent person would find difficult and painful if faced with them.  
Some choices are morally difficult because someone will be harmed or will suffer whatever choice is made—rather many moral dilemmas are like this—and morally decent people will tend to feel empathy for those who suffer or regret or remorse when making that choice.​[76]​ I take it that states like empathy have something in common with a whole range of moral emotions expressive of contrition—including guilt and remorse and regret and shame: all of them are associated with a painful phenomenology such that their actual occurrent experience is painful for their agent.  Morally decent people, I suppose, tend to feel empathy and contrition when making painful and difficult choices while evil people, by contrast, are not even morally decent and thus should not be expected to pain that morally decent people feel.​[77]​
If evil people lack the morally redeeming affective states possessed by barely decent people, then the following is plausible: 
(W3): a person, p, is evil only if, when faced with choices that a morally decent person would find painful, p tends to lack any affective state correlated with a painful phenomenology
Something like (W3) is surely necessary for any plausible analysis of evil personhood, and not simply because of the plausibility of supposing that evil people tend to lack morally redeeming empathy and contrition.  The virtues are badly understood merely as dispositions to act; more plausibly, they are multi-track dispositional states involving a range of tendencies, say, to perform certain actions in certain circumstances for certain reasons and with certain feelings.  Since evil people surely suffer from extreme viciousness​[78]​, they will surely lack the sort of morally redeeming feelings tied up with empathy and contrition that are constitutive of the virtues.  No surprise, then, that being evil involves the absence of affective states that are tied up with virtuous character.
	The absence of remorse and regret and shame also suggests that evil people identify with the desires that motivate their morally wrong actions.  For identification with a desire involves endorsing acting on that desire wholeheartedly and wholehearted endorsement involves, at the very least, the enjoyment of a certain kind of self-satisfaction with the condition of one’s will.  And self-satisfaction with one’s will in turn requires the absence of restlessness or resistance—the absence of any tendency or inclination to alter the condition of one’s will.​[79]​  Insofar as evil people lack any empathy or contrition, they would, to that extent, lack any inclination to alter the condition of their will and, to that extent, would identify with their wicked desires and motives and reasons for action.  Further, to the extent that accounts of moral responsibility that hinge on identification are plausible, evil people would seemingly be blameworthy for their wrongdoing, and to the extent that accounts of autonomy that hinge on identification are plausible, evil people would autonomously act wrongly.  So, the affective component of an analysis of evil personhood implicit in (W3) goes some way to explaining just how evil people can be blameworthy and morally responsible agents worthy of the worst sorts of moral disapprobation.

The Face of Evil
	The promise of the last section was to develop Benn’s discussion of wickedness into a full-blown analysis of wickedness tout court, in hope of thereby formulating an analysis of evil personhood.  (W1)-(W3) jointly constitute the following analysis of wickedness tout court and, ex hypothesi, evil personhood:
(W): A person, p, is evil just in case i) p’s action-issuing mechanism, M, is both weakly receptive and weakly reactive to moral reasons for action, ii) p is disposed to act wrongly and to knowingly transgress what morally decent people suppose are prohibitions against such actions in those circumstances, and iii) when faced with choices that a morally decent person would find painful, p tends to lack any affective state correlated with a painful phenomenology
More prosaically, the idea is this: an evil person—the worst of us—just is the sort of person who should have known better, who willingly transgresses moral boundaries, and lacks the moral concern possessed by barely decent people.  
One reason to suppose that (W) is correct is that it coheres with any number of platitudes about evil persons.  For example, it is intuitive that evil people tend to be regular sources of harm and suffering and misery; (W) explains why this should be so given that it implies that a disposition to act wrongly and be unencumbered by either typical moral restraints or feelings of guilt and shame and remorse.  Also, it is perhaps too obvious to suppose that evil people are not just somewhat vicious but very much so—otherwise, evil people would be indistinguishable from (merely) morally bad people.  Since the sort of person identified by (W) will suffer from both significantly flawed moral motivation and affect, she will undoubtedly suffer from a host of what would be uncontroversially identified as moral vices, including maliciousness and malevolence, but also antipathy, cruelty, callousness, and so on.  In short, the sort of person described by (W) will undoubtedly suffer from the most serious of vices in virtue of which she is rightly regarded as evil. 
Note also that (W) is consistent with common intuitions about contrition.  Intuitively, a person is morally redeemed, if only to a modest degree, if she is genuinely contrite about her past wrongdoing.  But a person who is morally redeemed, even to a modest degree, is a better sort of person than she was previously and not evil.  Moments before his execution, Robert Alton Harris mouthed “I’m sorry” to the father of one of his victims.​[80]​  This is in stark contrast to the smirking jerk abhorred even by his fellow death row inmates and suggests a significant improvement in Harris’ character.  Intuitions may vary, but if Harris was genuinely contrite then perhaps at the moment of his contrition he is no longer evil, however bad he may still be.  (W) is consistent with this result.
	Another reason to suppose that (W) is correct is that it is appropriately ambivalent about genuinely difficult cases.  Consider the case of Eichmann.  Reflection on Eichmann’s boring persona and lack of animus led Arendt to speak of the “banality” of evil and his own testimony certainly suggests he is evil.  For example, Eichmann declared that “I will jump into my grave laughing, because the fact that I have the death of five million Jews on my conscience gives me extraordinary satisfaction.”​[81]​ This suggests that did not find the choice to initiate and execute the Final Solution to be a painful one.  Further, he pointed to an occasion when he helped a half-Jewish cousin of his stepmother emigrate to Switzerland.​[82]​ If Eichmann could recognize the need of a family member as a reason and translate that reason into action, then Eichmann seems at least weakly responsive to moral reasons.  And there can be little doubt that Eichmann was disposed and willing to violate common moral transgressions.  As such, (W) suggests that Eichmann is evil.
	But things are not so simple.  At trial, Eichmann also spontaneously declared that he lived his whole life in accord with a Kantian definition of duty, declaring that “the principle of my will must always be such that it can become the principle of general laws.”​[83]​  Eichmann’s declaration is shocking partly because he invokes Kant’s pious name and partly because he got the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative just about right.  But it is difficult to believe that any serious reading of Kant could really justify deporting and exterminating millions.​[84]​ Given Eichmann’s proclivity for self-aggrandizing and conflicting statements, it is appropriate to question his sincerity.​[85]​  But at least some of Eichmann’s actions suggest that he was not entirely without a conscience.  Apparently, after slapping the leader of Vienna’s Jewish community in the face—one of his “favorite Jews”—Eichmann repeatedly apologized in front of his staff and continued to be bothered by his behavior even after apologizing.​[86]​ Arguably, if Eichmann really did have a conscience, if he really was deeply troubled by the role he played in the deaths of millions, then however twisted he is, he is not evil given that he fails to meet the condition for being evil implicit in (W3).  
	The point is this: it is difficult to determine if Eichmann is evil partly because certain facts about Eichmann’s moral psychology are in dispute.  But (W) can make sense of this: if it turns out that Eichmann could have been worse, then (W) implies that he is not evil, but if his occasional morally appropriate behavior does not reflect his true character or amounts to a façade, then (W) allows that he is evil.  It is no flaw of a philosophical analysis that it fails to yield unequivocal conclusions in contested cases.
	However, another sort of individual is more problematic for (W): the psychopath, or rather, the “psychopath” as is often enough conceived of.  It is often enough suggested by moral philosophers that psychopaths fail to be adequately responsive to moral reasons, either because they are incapable of recognizing their existence or because they are incapable of translating those reasons into action—failures of receptivity or reactivity to moral reasons, respectively.​[87]​  But if psychopaths are not even weakly receptive or reactive to moral reasons, then they are not evil according to (W).  And that result is at least problematic given that psychopaths are often regarded as the epitome of evil.​[88]​
	However, the psychopath is only problematic if conceived of in the above manner—that is, as a being entirely unresponsive to moral reasons.  It is far from clear that psychopaths, properly understood, should be understood in this way.  In his important work, Blair noted that a group of psychopathic prisoners suffer from a diminished capacity to distinguish genuinely moral and merely conventional transgressions, a capacity that allows even typical children to recognize their difference.​[89]​ But it does not follow that psychopaths misidentify every genuinely moral transgression as a merely conventional one nor that they cannot draw the distinction altogether.  And even if psychopaths suffer from a diminished capacity to identify and distinguish genuinely moral transgressions this admittedly diminished capacity might still suffice for moral responsibility.​[90]​ And if psychopaths are at all able to distinguish genuinely moral from merely conventional transgressions, then it seems that they are at least weakly receptive to moral reasons and perhaps weakly responsive to them as well.
	Arguably, (W) squares well with a standard psychological understanding of psychopathy. It is sometimes suggested that psychopathy and sociopathy come to the same thing.​[91]​ But there are good reasons for not identifying the two.  First, some have suggested that ‘sociopathy’ and not ‘psychopathy’ should be used to refer to the products of poor socialization practices.​[92]​ If sociopathy is the result of situational influences while psychopathy has, say, a genetic basis then arguably the two should be kept distinct.  Second, and more importantly, there is a necessary affective component to psychopathy but not sociopathy. Given the criteria specifically mentioned in the DSM-IV-TR, an individual with suffering from a chronic failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest,” “irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults,” and “reckless disregard for safety of self and others” could well be diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder (ASPD), absent any consideration of that individual’s emotional or affective states.  However, lack of remorse and guilt and empathy are “key symptoms of psychopathy.”​[93]​ (W) captures this difference and indeed makes the absence of constitutive emotional and affective states essential to evil personhood.
There is, admittedly, a danger of equivocating here.  For even if the sort of individuals that philosophers identify as psychopaths—call them “philosophical psychopaths”—are importantly different from the sort of individual picked out by a more precise definition of the term, philosophical psychopaths might still be possible; they are certainly conceivable.  Thus, there is at least a possible sort of individual—the philosophical psychopath—who is every bit as dangerous and uncaring and unrepentant as we expect psychopaths to be but is not evil precisely because he is not even weakly receptive and reactive to moral reasons.  I have already conceded that such individuals are possible, but given that such individuals are more akin to beasts and monsters, I lose the intuition that it is appropriate to hold philosophical psychopaths morally responsible rather than taking up the sort of “objective attitude” that we take towards rabid dogs.  As such, I lose the intuition that there is something counter-intuitive about refraining from using moralizing language like “evil” to describe philosophical psychopaths.  So, understood in one sense, the psychopath is no counter-example to (W) while understood in another sense, the psychopath actually confirms (W).  
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